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THE INADEQUACY OF ADEQUACY GUARANTEES:
A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT ARE THE BASIS
FOR SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
JOSEPH P. VITERITTI*
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional provisions that propel most adequacy law-
suits date back to the nineteenth century. Applying language formu-
lated then to courtroom battles that unfold now can be artful, even fan-
ciful. Adequacy clauses do not exist in most state constitutions.
Attorneys have construed adequacy as a loose legal standard from lan-
guage that had a different meaning when most of the state constitu-
tions were adopted. In order to be effective, lawyers need to persuade
jurists that what they seek to achieve for their clients is compelled by
the law, or better yet, by the constitutions that judges interpret and en-
force. Class action suits often involve another step in which attorneys
strive to convince their clients that a settlement won is not only in their
best interest, but that it will also benefit others similarly situated. Such
is not always the case, whether or not the lawyers believe it.
State constitutions reflect not only the thinking and aspirations
of the times in which they were written, but the biases as well--or at
least the prejudices of those who held political power when the docu-
ments were written. The history that shaped the drafting of state con-
stitutions during the nineteenth century varied from state to state and
from region to region. Yet there are discernible patterns. Nineteenth-
century political history is riddled with racial, ethnic, and religious
bigotry, all of which are manifest in the state constitutions under which
we live. While recent jurisprudence has moderated the effects of these
shameful dispositions from the past, the legal residue is still with us
* Joseph P. Viteritti is the Blanche D. Blank Professor of Public Policy at Hunter College,
CUNY. He is the author of THE LAST FREEDOM: RELIGION FROM THE PUBLIC SCHOOL TO THE
PUBLIC SQUARE (Princeton University Press, 2007) and CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the conference on "The Adequacy Lawsuit: Its
Origins and Ongoing Impact on American Education" held at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University on October 13, 2005, and at the Franklin and Eleanor Roo-
sevelt Faculty Seminar on Public Policy at Hunter College, CUNY on February 28, 2006. Jen-
nifer Panicali (Hunter, 2006) provided valuable research assistance.
2007] THE INADEQUACY OF ADEQUACY GUARANTEES 59
and sometimes gets factored into court rulings handed down in the
name of poor children.
This article traces how judicial interpretation of nineteenth cen-
tury language that appears in most state constitutions inhibits the abili-
ty of state courts and legislatures to meet the legitimate educational
needs of poor and minority students. Part II outlines the judicial retreat
from an equity standard to an adequacy standard in school finance liti-
gation. Part III explains the evolution and nature of adequacy suits.
Part IV documents the early history of state constitutional language re-
quiring education and mandating its inherent racial discrimination.
Part V concerns the origins of the common school model and its in-
grained religious, ethnic, and class biases. Part VI reviews the ignoble
history of "Blaine Amendments" that exist in contemporary state con-
stitutions. Part VII explains the effects of the legal legacy previously
outlined and its negative effects on the outcome of school finance liti-
gation. Part VIII proposes a way to refashion the legal remedies of
school finance suits so that they are more equitable and responsive to
the needs of the children they are supposed to benefit.
II. FROM EQUITY TO ADVOCACY
Adequacy suits are frequently referred to by legal scholars as
the "third wave" of school finance litigation.' During the first wave,
challenges were grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Serrano v. Priest,2 for example, the California
Supreme Court found that funding disparities generated by a system
based on local property taxes violated the federal constitutional rights
of people who lived in property poor districts. The second wave is
marked by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,3 the
1973 decision in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that
funding disparities in education do not necessarily violate rights pro-
tected by the federal constitution. In Rodriguez, a five-person majority
1. See generally William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of Montana, Ken-
tucky, and Texas for the Future of School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219
(1990); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litiga-
tion: The Massachusetts Decision as Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994) (hereinafter "Judicial
Analysis"); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995); Julie K. Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 517 (1991); Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to
Recent Judicial School Finance Ruling, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507 (1991).
2. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
3. 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973).
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ruled that "education, of course is not among the rights afforded expli-
cit attention under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying that it is explicitly protected.",4 The decision was a major
setback in the movement for educational and racial equality that began
with the landmark Brown v. Board of Education5 decision of 1954.
Rodriguez, in fact, was a direct contradiction of the holding of Brown,
which in addition to outlawing racial segregation in public schools,
proclaimed that educational opportunity "is a right that must be made
available to all on equal terms."
6
The practical effect of Rodriguez was to remove the federal
courts from the battle over educational finance, and to a certain extent
from the continuing discussion about educational opportunity. The net
result was to place such matters in the hands of the state courts and ul-
timately the state legislatures. It takes a leap of faith, and perhaps a bit
of amnesia, to rely on state governments to serve as mechanisms for
resolving the injustices heaped on disadvantaged minorities. The
American civil rights movement began when the federal courts struck
down decisions made by state legislators and judges that perpetuated
injustices against disfavored citizens.7 The practices in question not
only enforced racial discrimination in education and other public facil-
ities, but also created obstacles to voting for African Americans, espe-
cially in the South.8 The Brown decision established an important
precedent for later federal court rulings that would outlaw discrimina-
tion in public facilities outside of education, many of which were fur-
ther undermined at the state level.9
Brown also moved Congress to take aggressive action by pro-
moting educational opportunity through compensatory funding for dis-
advantaged children. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA) of 1965 was then the most ambitious investment of federal
money to date.' 0 Subsequent evaluations, however, revealed that the
4. Id. at 24.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Id. at 493.
7. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 27-74,
157-80, 217-302 (2000); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-156 (1991).
8. Joseph P. Viteritti, Unapportioned Justice: Local Elections, Social Science and the
Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 199-214 (1994).
9. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND
FEDERAL POLICY IN THE POST-BROWN ERA 43-44 (1986).
10. STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH MOSHER, ESEA-THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
ADMINISTERS A LAW 23-30, 6Q-71 (1968).
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states had treated the new money as general aid rather than channeling
it to the neediest children and bridging the achievement gap.I I
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 represents the most re-
cent attempt by the federal government to hold the states accountable
for narrowing the achievement gap, 12 but reports indicate that many
states are responding by reducing their standards in order to minimize
the risk of noncompliance.' 3 This has led to a new demand for national
standards among many education advocates, in which the federal gov-
ernment would once again be cast in the role of rescuing the states
from their own hidebound inclinations. 14 Given the pull and tug of
federal-state relationships since Brown, it is difficult to put much faith
in the ability of the states to act in the best interests of the most unde-
rachieving students. A close examination of state history with regard
to "adequacy" provisions is even more discouraging.
There has been some notable progress realized under the ban-
ner of school finance reform, but it has been both limited and limit-
ing.15 Initially, state litigation for school finance reform mimicked the
activity from the first wave. Plaintiffs built their claims primarily on
the strength of equal protection clauses found in state constitutions,
and to a lesser extent on their education clauses. 16 They demanded
equality in spending, but more often than not failed to get it. 17 State
courts were reluctant to force legislatures to do something they were
not inclined to do: redistribute locally generated funds from wealthy
11. Launor F. Carter, The Sustaining Effects Study of Compensatory and Elementary
Education, 13 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 (1984); Goeffrey D. Borman & Jerome V. D'Agostino,
Title I and Student Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of Federal Evaluation Results 18 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 309 (1996); MICHAEL PUMA ET AL., PROSPECTS: THE FINAL
REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES (ABT Assocs. 1997).
12. See PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL EDUCATION
AGENDA (2006); PATRICK J. McGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005 (2006).
13. CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., THE STATE OF THE STATE STANDARDS 2006,
http://www.edexcellence.net/foundation/publication/publication.cfm?id=358; Lynn Olson,
Gaps in Proficiency Levels on State Tests and NAEP Found to Grow, EDUC. WK., Apr. 18,
2007, at 12.
14. Alyson Klein, Education Trust Offers NCLB Renewal Plan, EDUC. WK., Apr. 18,
2007, at 21-22.
15. Michael Heise, Equal Education Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of
School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA.
L. REV. 543 (1998) (providing a sobering empirical analysis of the tangible benefits derived
from school finance suits); see also James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J.
249, 290-93 (1999).
16. See supra note 1.
17. Plaintiffs did manage to win court battles in Arkansas, California, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Judicial Analysis, supra note 1, at 601-03.
Suits in thirteen other states failed. Id.
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and powerful suburban districts to benefit mostly poor, mostly urban
districts that did not have the same political and economic clout. 18 Po-
litically speaking, the wholesale redistribution of funding would have
been an unnatural act.
There are three broad ways to conceive of justice with regard
to school spending. 19 The most progressive approach would allocate
the greatest amount of resources and opportunities to children with the
greatest educational and social needs, since these students have more
challenges to overcome to reach an acceptable level of academic
achievement. A middle range approach would allocate the same
amount of resources and opportunities to all children, based on a sim-
ple definition of equality. 2 The most regressive approach would give
more resources and opportunities to the most advantaged children of
society, based on the assumption that their parents have more to give
to them, and that they ought to be able to do so if they desire. 22 The
distributional arrangement derived from adequacy suits fits squarely in
the third category. It does not guarantee that the bulk of the resources
that result from the settlement of these suits is awarded to those stu-
dents who are supposedly the object of the litigation. As a conse-
quence, even the most generous of settlements have failed to generate
significant improvement in student academic performance among the
economically disadvantaged.23 It is not a strong starting point for a
campaign launched in the name of the poor.
III. ADEQUACY SUITS
The third wave of school finance litigation, formulated under
the adequacy banner, was somewhat of a retreat from the promise of
educational opportunity demanded by Brown and halted by Rodriguez.
The reasoning went something like this: if the courts could not per-
suade elected legislators to equalize funding between the rich and the
poor, then perhaps they could agree on a minimum level of adequacy
18. Paul Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform,
48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995).
19. JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 23-25 (1999).
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id. at 39.
23. Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact and Future, in SCHOOL FINANCE: ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 65 (Helen Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
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to which all children were entitled.24 This left the door open for weal-
thy districts to continue spending more. The claims were tied to a va-
riety of education clauses found in state constitutions, 25 which will be
examined below. In Rose v. Council for Better Education,26 the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky found that educational spending and
achievement were so low compared to other states that it imposed a
statewide remedy designed to benefit all districts, including those that
had allocated more than the average. 27
The Kentucky legislature responded by prescribing a three-tier
system of funding.28 It guaranteed a minimum level of spending for all
districts, offered matching funds to districts that taxed themselves at
up to 15% above the foundation level, and allowed wealthy districts to
tax themselves an additional 15%, thereby spending more than all oth-
29er localities. Total education spending was increased by more than
$1 billion.30 While the legislature promised to ensure "high academic
standards for all children" and cut the spending gap between rich and
poor by half, it steered clear of the equality rule that guided earlier dis-
cussions.31
Rather than focus entirely on spending, adequacy lawsuits in-
troduced the notion of a quality education. In Rose, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court identified seven basic developmental capacities that must
be targeted for all students, which included such factors as oral and
written communication skills; knowledge of economic, social, and po-
litical systems; respect for physical and mental wellness; appreciation
of the arts; preparation for higher education or vocational training; and
readiness for gainful employment. 32 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia set down similarly specific educational objectives for
24. See supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
27. Id. at 215-16.
28. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of KY. REV. STAT. ANN., chs. 156-65 and other scattered chap-
ters).
29. Id.; see also Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Policy & Students' Opportunities
to Learn: Kentucky's Experience, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, winter 1997, at 79; C. Scott
Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599 (1995).
30. Jacob E. Adams, Jr., supra note 29, at 81.
31. C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, supra note 29, at 599, 605-09, 612-13; see
also JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 74 (2004).
32. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
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enforcing an adequacy judgment under its constitution in Pauley v.
Kelley.
33
Unsatisfied with what had been achieved under its previous
equity-based ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v.
Burke34 ordered the state legislature to guarantee spending in poor ur-
ban districts on par with the amount spent in wealthy suburban dis-
tricts and to provide supplementary programs designed to eliminate
disadvantages. 35 In subsequent rulings, the court, at the urging of the
plaintiffs, prescribed a number of programmatic entitlements.3 6 These
included whole school reform, full-day kindergarten, pre-school for all
three and four-year olds, the correction of building code violations, the
creation of additional classroom space, social services, increased secu-
rity, after-school programs, and summer-school programs.37 All of
these initiatives were required under the auspices of the "thorough and
efficient" clause of the New Jersey Constitution. As time passed,
New Jersey continued to add districts that were eligible for relief under
the Abbott ruling, finally bringing the number to thirty-one.
39
In order to address overcrowding and poor maintenance in dis-
advantaged, mostly urban districts, New Jersey created a School Con-
struction Corporation in 2002 and endowed it with an $8.6 billion
budget. 40 In September 2005, the New York Times ran a lead story do-
cumenting incompetence, lack of planning, and shady dealings that led
to the cancellation of two hundred school projects over the previous
summer.4 1 Then, in March 2006, a report by the State Commission of
Investigation revealed that school districts had lavished local education
officials throughout the state with cars, computers, cell phones, exces-
sive pension benefits, and tax-deferred annuities. 42 The following
33. These included literacy, mathematical ability, knowledge of government, self-
knowledge, preparation for work and further education, recreational pursuits, the arts and so-
cial ethics. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1989).
34. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 400, 402 (N.J. 1990).
35. Id.; see also Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational
Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827 (1998).
36. Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 455-57 (N.J. 1998).
37. See Education Law Center, http://www.edlawcenter.org (last visited Aug. 8, 2007)
(providing up-to-date developments related to Abbott).
38. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
39. Education Law Center, http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/
AbbottProfile.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
40. Jeffrey Gettleman, In New Jersey, Another Year of Cramped and Dated Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at B1.
41. Id.
42. Richard Lezin Jones, Leading New Jersey's Schools Has its Price: High, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at BI.
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month, Governor John Corzine, a newly elected liberal Democrat, re-
ceived approval from the New Jersey Supreme Court to freeze the
amount of state aid given to the "Abbott districts," which ended a rou-
tine of annual spending increases.
43
It stands to reason that it takes more resources to bring disad-
vantaged students to a desirable level of performance than it does for
advantaged students. By requiring significant increases in expendi-
tures, the New Jersey case also signaled a continued emphasis on edu-
cational inputs in addition to the kinds of educational outcomes that
were previously outlined by the Kentucky and West Virginia courts.
44
While educational aspirations can only be achieved through concrete
programmatic initiatives, the focus on resources can also serve as a
distraction from the fundamental interests of the children who are the
aggrieved parties in school finance litigation. One approach responds
to the needs of school systems, the other to the needs of school child-
ren. The detailed programmatic nature of the New Jersey ruling also
indicated that the courts, at least in some jurisdictions, could use state
constitutions to define adequacy in almost any way they chose.
In 2003, New York State's highest court declared that New
York City had failed to provide all of its children with a "sound basic
education" in violation of the state constitution.45 The Court of Ap-
peals of New York's finding in this 10 year adequacy suit was rooted
in constitutional language that requires the legislature to maintain and
support "a system of free common schools, wherein all children of this
state may be educated., 46 The court equated "sound basic education"
with "the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to ena-
ble children to eventually function productively as civic participants
capable of voting and serving on a jury," which it determined was con-
sistent with the purpose that the constitutional framers had in mind
when they drafted the education clause in 1894.4 7
Between the 1989-1990 and the 2003-2004 academic years, the
school budget in New York had risen by 23% in inflation-adjusted dol-
43. Gregory J. Volpe, Court OKs Freezing Aid, HOME NEWS TRIB. (New Brunswick,
N.J.), May 10, 2006, at Al.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
45. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d. 326, 340 (N.Y. 2003) [herei-
nafter Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. II. See also Brian J. Nickerson & Gerald M. Denihan,
From Equity to Adequacy: The Legal Battle for Increased Funding of Poor Districts in New
York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1341 (2003) (providing a history of the case).
46. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 361 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1.
47. Id. at 330.
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48lars. In November 2006, the Court of Appeals of New York ruled
that the state legislature must provide an additional $1.93 billion per
year to the city schools in order to settle the suit,49even though total
operating and capital spending for schools grew 42.3% to $15.2 bil-
lion.50 The amount was derived from a recommendation made by the
governor, who had commissioned a study to determine the cost of re-
medying the state constitutional violation.51 In its ruling, the court re-
jected a proposal put forward by the trial judge, based on his own ex-
pert report, which would have increased the operating budget by $5.63
billion per year.52 The four to two majority determined that as a matter
of law, the trial court had overstepped its judicial authority in substitut-
ing its own calculation for that of the executive branch.
53
In an attempt to bring the remedy more in line with the needs
of city school children, the governor's office, several amici and a con-
curring judge had originally encouraged the court to adopt the New
York State Learning Standards as a method for realizing a "sound ba-
sic education. 54 The Court of Appeals of New York responded that
elements of the Learning Standards approved by the Board of Regents
and Commissioner of Education "exceed notions of a minimally ade-
quate or sound basic education," suggesting that they might be too ri-
gorous a measure.55 Instead, the court ultimately settled on a financial
target, with full knowledge that additional spending could not guaran-
tee a satisfactory improvement in student performance. 56 Its judgment
seemed to suggest that it was better to err on the side of more spending
than higher student performance.57 While reasonable people can argue
over the original meaning of the education clause intended by the 1894
New York State Legislature, it is fairly safe to say that its aim was not
maintaining educational deprivation at the highest possible cost.
48. Lawsuit Remains Unsettled, But School Spending Continues to Rise, INSIDE THE
BUDGET (New York City Indep. Budget Office, New York, N.Y.), July 19, 2005, at 1.
49. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. II]. See also Gail Robinson, The Last Word in School
Funding, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Nov. 27, 2006, http://www.gothamgazette.com/print/2044 (pro-
viding a useful historical overview of the case).
50. See supra note 48.
51. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. II, 861 N.E.2d at 55.
52. Id. at 57-58.
53. Id. at 57-59.
54. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. 1, 801 N.E.2d. at 354-55 (Smith, J., concur-
ring).
55. Id. at 332.
56. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. II, 861 N.E.2d at 360-61 (Smith, J., concurring).
57. Id.
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IV. EARLY HISTORY
William Thro has identified four types of education clauses in
state constitutions that impose increasing levels of obligation on state
legislatures. 58 Category I clauses create a minimal obligation for the
state, requiring nothing more than a system of free public schools. 59
Such language is found in the New York State Constitution.6° Catego-
ry II clauses involve more specific mandates such as the "thorough and
efficient clause" found in the New Jersey constitution. 61 Others in this
category refer to a "uniform" or "general and uniform" system of
schools.62
Category III clauses embody an aspirational objective that edu-
cation is to achieve. 63 California's constitution, for example, requires
the legislature to "encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement. " 64 Rhode
Island's education clause instructs the legislature to "adopt all means
which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to all people the
advantages and opportunities of education." 65 Category IV clauses im-
pose the greatest obligation and designate the proper priority afforded
education for the state. 66 Thus, the Washington Constitution refers to
education as a "paramount duty." 67 Georgia refers to a "primary obli-
gation.', 68 Florida's recently amended constitution refers to education
as "fundamental" and "paramount" and calls for the "adequate provi-
69
sion" of education. In all, eighteen states have Category I provisions,
twenty-two have Category II, six have Category III, and four have
Category IV.
70
58. William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provi-
sions in Public School Finance Reform, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661-70 (1989).
59. Id. at 1661-62.
60. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (mentioning "a system of free common schools").
61. Thro, supra note 58 at 1663-64 (citing N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl.l.)
62. Id. at n. 11.
63. Id. at 1666.
64. CAL. CONST. art IX, § 1.
65. R.I. CONST. art XII, § 1.
66. Thro, supra note 58 at 1667.
67. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
68. GA. CONST. art VIII, para. 1.
69. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. See Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting a New Stan-
dard for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make "Adequate
Provision "for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 343 (2000). See also Barbara J. Santos,
School Finance Litigation in Florida: A Historical Analysis, 23 STETSON L. REV. 497 (1994).70 Mills & McLendon, supra note 69 at 343-46. See also Mills & McLendon, supra note 69, at
342-43 (providing a complete breakdown of state constitutional provisions).
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Despite their rising levels of specificity, these provisions set an
imprecise standard for defining educational adequacy and leave open
the question of whether it should be realized in terms of financial in-
puts or student outcomes. Should "thorough" and "efficient" com-
mands be treated with equal weight? Does "uniform" mean that all
children should be educated in exactly the same way? At what point
does uniformity become rigidity? How far does the legislature need to
go to "encourage" the "promotion" of a "suitable" education for "im-
provement?" If education is the single most important function per-
formed by the state, then all the legislature is required to do is invest
more money in schooling than any other state function. Factoring in
local expenditures, most, if not all, states were already doing exactly
this prior to the first wave of school finance litigation.
71
While most of the state constitutions can be traced to the nine-
teenth century, a serious historical review requires us to reach back
even further. The Puritans of New England placed great value on edu-
cation and had a firm understanding of its importance to society.72 In
1642, the Massachusetts School Law authorized local town officials to
hold parents accountable for their children's ability "to read and un-
derstand the principles of religion and the capitall lawes of this coun-
try."73 It was not the intention of the legislature then to create a school
system or require localities to support one.74 Lawmakers placed the
duty to educate squarely with parents. 75 Yet with judicial approval, se-
lect men could apprentice out the children of parents who were
deemed "not to be able and fitt" in order to meet their educational re-
sponsibilities.7
6
In 1647, the Massachusetts legislature passed the Old Deluder
Satan Act.77 This law was to frustrate the "chiefe project of that ould
deluder, Satan, to keepe men from the knowledge of the Scriptures,"
which the Puritans believed would have undermined public morality
71. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 285 (Barnes & Noble, Inc.
1973) (1962) (providing a table indicating that as of 1967 state and local expenditures on edu-.
cation exceeded those in every other category of state and local expenditures). See generally
Ronald K. Snell, Corina Eckl & Graham Williams, State Spending in the 1990's, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2003), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/
stspend90s.htm (discussing how state and federal spending grew in the 1990's and the impact
it had on various social programs).
72. William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 B.C. L.
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and civil society. 78 The legislation required towns of more than fifty
households to employ a teacher for instruction in reading and writ-
ing.79 The teacher's wages could be paid by either the parents of stu-
dents or by the general population. Towns of 100 or more households
were required to open a grammar school to prepare students for further
education. 8' By this time, several Massachusetts localities had already
made arrangements for educating students. Now the legislature was
mandating education without a commitment to assist the funding of
schools.
8 2
After the colonies declared their independence from England in
831776, eleven of the original thirteen states adopted new constitutions.
Only five of these documents included references to education. 84 Of
twenty-five state constitutions adopted or revised between 1776 and
1800, twelve incorporated some kind of provision for education. 85 Ac-
cording to John Eastman, these early inclusions were of two kinds:
hortatory additions and specific demands for legislative action.86 The
Massachusetts Constitution drafted by John Adams in 1780 is exem-
plary of the first type. 87 Because it is such an important part of our po-
litical, legal, and educational history, it is worth quoting at length:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of the people, being neces-
sary for the preservation of their rights and liberties...
it shall be the duty of legislators and magistrates... to
cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and
all seminaries of them; especially the university at
Cambridge, public schools, and grammar schools in the
towns; to encourage private societies and public institu-
tions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades manufac-
78. MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOL LAW OF 1647 (1647), reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at 394 (Sol Cohen ed., Random House, Inc.)
(1974).
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tures, and a natural history of the country; to counten-
ance and inculcate the principles of humanity and gen-
eral benevolence, public and private charity, industry
and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings,
sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and ge-
nerous sentiments, among the people.
88
Like Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Thomas Jeffer-
son and many of his contemporaries, Adams believed that education
was essential to a healthy democracy. 89 If the success of the state de-
pended on a knowledgeable, well-rounded, and civically responsible
populace, it was only reasonable for government to provide for its
education. When Adams wrote his constitution, most education in the
Bay State was under the direction of the clergy, including the universi-
ty in Cambridge founded by Congregationalists." Except for a nine-
teenth century amendment that prohibited aid to religious institutions,
the education clause from Mr. Adams' constitution remains in effect
today. 91
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was a model for the
New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 and for those of several states
that joined the Union in the early part of the nineteenth century, in-
cluding Indiana (1816), Tennessee (1834), and Arkansas (1836).92 The
United States Congress also drew inspiration from the language of the
Massachusetts Constitution when it adopted the Northwest Ordinance
in 1787. 93 This law, which was to provide for the orderly settlement of
lands north of the Ohio River, read: "Religion, morality, and know-
ledge being necessary to government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.
9 4
These aspirations were embraced by a number of state constitutions,
including Ohio, Missouri, Mississippi, Kansas, Nebraska and North
Carolina.95 More obligatory provisions appeared in the early constitu-
88. Id. at 3-4 (referencing the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 as the first constitu-
tion with a hortatory provision).
89. LORRAINE SMITH PANGLE & THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE LEARNING OF LIBERTY: THE
EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 91-105 (1993).
90. GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT
ESTABLISHMENT To ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 33-47 (1994).
91. Eastman, supra note 83, at 4.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 7-8.
94. Northwest Ordinance of 1781 art. 1II, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at LIII (2000).
95. Eastman, supra note 83 at 8.
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tions of North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Georgia.96 In ad-
dition to requiring that "schools shall be established," North Carolina
provided that teacher salaries be "paid by the public., 97 While Ver-
mont called for teacher salaries to be supported by each town, Georgia
assigned financial responsibility to the state. 98 Finally, the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution of 1790 specifically provided for the "free education"
of poor children. 99
Between 1800 and 1834, eight new states joined the Union, and
six of the existing ones wrote new constitutions.' All but three, Loui-
siana, Illinois and Virginia, contained some provision concerning edu-
cation, and two included "equality" clauses.' 0' Connecticut called for
the creation of a school fund for the "support and encouragement of
the public or common schools throughout the State, and for the equal
benefit of all people thereof."' 1 2 Indiana called for a "general system of
education... equally open to all," 0 3 but the provision contained an
escape clause that read, "as soon as circumstances permit." This phrase
not only left the "equality" commitment uncertain, but the overall
funding for the education system as well.
In 1816, the Indiana legislature passed a law created to elabo-
rate on its constitutional intent, which would prove to be a conspicuous
sign of the times. Lawmakers agreed that public schools should be
"open and free to all the white children resident in the school dis-
trict. ' 04 Much later, in 1850, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that
"colored" children were not even permitted "to attend public schools,
paying their own tuition, where the resident parents of white children
attending, or desiring to attend said schools object."'1 5 In reaching its
conclusion, Indiana's high court cited an Ohio Supreme Court decision
deferring to the legislature "as to whom the teacher may admit to the
privileges of the school."'10 6 While most state constitutions had defined
a public obligation to provide education, most state courts and legisla-
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Eastman, supra note 83, at 11-12.
102. Id. at 12 (citing CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 2).
103. Id. at 11-12 (citing IND. CONST. of IX, § 2).
104. Id. at 12 (citing An Act for Revising and Consolidating the Statutes of the State of
Indiana, ch. 15, art. V, § 102, 1843 Rev. Stat. of Ind. 65, 320).
105. Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 334 (1850).
106. Eastman, supra note 83 at 12.
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tures refrained from deeming education a right, especially when it
came to minority children. 1
07
In 1849, the Massachusetts Supreme Court heard a case
brought by the parents of Sarah Roberts, a five-year-old black girl who
had been excluded from attending an all white school in Boston.,
°8
The suit was brought to enforce a Massachusetts statute authorizing
that "any child unlawfully excluded from public school instruction, in
the Commonwealth, shall recover damages... against the city or town
by which such public instruction is supported."' 9 The court ruled that
Sarah was not entitled to attend the school nearest her home because a
"colored" school existed in another part of the district."1 ° The court
further explained that the state constitution "will not warrant the asser-
tion, that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and
political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the
same functions and be subject to the same treatment."' 11 This was not
the antebellum South, but Boston, the cradle of liberty, the place where
Horace Mann breathed life into the idea of a common school.
It was a generally accepted practice throughout the country to
separate children by race in places where black children received any
education. The fathers of public schooling were not particularly open-
minded when it came to women either. As late as 1789, when the city
of Boston first considered creating grammar schools for girls, oppo-
nents protested that female minds were inferior and that educating
them would disturb the social order. 112 Since women were not quali-
fied to vote or hold office, they did not need to prepare for the respon-
sibilities of citizenship. 113 And the duties women took on in the family
did not require them to have the same education as men who went out
into the world and pursued serious careers in business and govern-
ment. 114 State law reflected the values, priorities, and prejudices of the
nineteenth century. Unfortunately, this restrictive social paradigm con-
tinued to affect subsequent education policy.
107. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I 11. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849).
112. DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF
COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 26 (1990).
113. Id. at 16-24.
114. Id.
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V. THE COMMON SCHOOL
Even though the history of the common school varies from re-
gion to region and state to state,' 15 it is fitting to begin its story with
Horace Mann. 1 6 Mann, who served as secretary to the Massachusetts
school committee from 1837 to 1848, was more thoroughly influential
than any educational leader of the time in articulating the goals of pub-
lic education as it began to emerge in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 17 The widely read and quoted annual reports Mann prepared for
the state board of education are the first chapter in the canon of Amer-
ican public schooling." 8 His vision was bold and ambitious, but it was
also tainted. The "grand machinery" 119 of education that Mann im-
agined was a reactionary response to a large infusion of immigrants,
many of whom were poor laborers that had come from Ireland to es-
cape famine. 12 Mann saw education as a tool to eliminate poverty,
prepare workers, promote morality, and create citizens.121
Mann, more than anything else, sought to make Americans of
the foreign masses that had come to the city, but his notion of what it
meant to be an American was a narrow one. Mann equated being a
good American with being a good Protestant. 122 His 1844 report read,
"no student of history, or observer of mankind, can be hostile to the
precepts and the doctrines of Christian religion."'1 23 Only the Irish had
sufficient numbers to rebel against the Protestant dominated political
majority that controlled politics in Massachusetts. 124 During Mann'stenure as secretary of education, five of eight members of the Massa-
115. LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925 (1987);
DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION, 1785-1954 (1987).
116. CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 146-178 (1988).
117. See THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE
MAN 3-28 (Lawrence Cremin ed., 1957).
118. Id. at 29-112.
119. Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL 79 (Law-
rence Cremin ed., 1957).
120. GLENN, supra note 116, at 146-206. See generally FREDERICK M. BINDER, THE AGE
OF THE COMMON SCHOOL, 1830-1865 (1974) (providing a more general history of the common
school).
121. MANN, supra note 119, at 79-112.
122. GLENN, supra note 116, at 146-206. See generally STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, THE
CULTURE FACTORY: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1789-1860 (1973) (offering a critical look at
the development of the common school in Boston).
123. MANN, supra note 119, at 102.
124. See STEVEN P. ERIE, RAINBOW'S END: IRISH AMERICANS AND THE DILEMMAS OF
MACHINE POLITICS, 1840-1985 25-26 (1988) (noting that between 1846 and 1855, the percen-
tage of the Boston population that was Catholic grew from 2% to 20%).
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chusetts school board were Protestant ministers, and most local school
committees were controlled by churchmen. 125 Mann never went so far
as to say that he would prohibit non-Protestants from teaching in his
public schools, but he did feel "perfectly authorized to inquire" of such
a person's willingness to use the Protestant Bible.1
26
Having failed to rid public schools of Protestant religious con-
tent, Catholic leaders demanded support for their own parochial
schools, creating a backlash from the Protestant majority. 127 In 1854,
the Massachusetts legislature, urged on by the anti-immigrant Know-
Nothing Party, passed the nation's first compulsory education law.
128
This statute was designed as much to exert control over the rebellious
Catholic minority, as it was to provide universal education., 29 Two
years later, with the Know-Nothing party firmly in control of the go-
vernorship and the legislature, Massachusetts passed a constitutional
amendment prohibiting aid to religious schools and created a Nunnery
Investigating Committee. 130 This committee conducted surprise visits
to Catholic convents and proposed legislation limiting voting rights
and public office to native-born citizens.' 31 Through the end of the ni-
neteenth century, the legislature established various committees that
oversaw and harassed private and parochial schools in the name of
common education. 
32
What was going on in Massachusetts was emblematic of de-
velopments taking place throughout the country. In 1854, the Know-
Nothings sent seventy-five members to Congress, and were about to
take control of the state legislatures in Connecticut, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Maryland, and Kentucky.' 33 They also had a strong
125. JORGENSEN, supra note 115, at 31.
126. Id. at 37.
127. There is an extensive literature on the Catholic protests that took place in various
cities. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1805- 1973
33-66 (1976); JAMES SANDERS, THE EDUCATION OF AN URBAN MINORITY: CATHOLICS IN
CHICAGO, 1833-1965 121-39 (1977); MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA RIOTS OF 1844:
A STUDY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 23-27, 33-38, 78-95, 99-116, 143-159 (1975); SCHULTZ, supra
note 122, at 235-36, 251, 255-57.
128. Thomas James, Rights of Conscience and State School Systems in Nineteenth Cen-
tury America, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 126 (Paul
Finkelman & Stephen Gottlieb eds., 1991).
129. Id. at 117, 126-27.
130. See JORGENSEN, supra note 115, at 87-89. See also JOHN R. MULKERN, THE KNOW-
NOTHING PARTY IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE RISE AND FALL OF A PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT 102-103
(1990).
131. JORGENSEN, Supra note 115, at 87-89.
132. Id.
133. RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1800-1860 388-89 (1938).
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presence in New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia,
Alabama, and Louisiana. 134 Although Massachusetts was the only state
to require Bible-reading by law, the practice was followed in seventy-
five to eighty percent of schools throughout the country. 135 Compul-
sory Bible-reading was upheld by the state courts in most places since
those who sat on the bench were an extension of the dominant soci-
opolitical system that created the challenged education policies. 1 One
Maine court ruled in 1854 that "if the majority of the school be Protes-
tants, the [school] committee can enforce such a system of instruction
upon all."
'137
Between 1835 and the beginning of the Civil War, nine new
states were admitted to the Union and fourteen others revised their
constitutions. 138 Of these, only Illinois and Virginia still did not have
education provisions, and nine states had obligatory constitutional
mandates for education.' 39 Four states-New Jersey, Ohio, Minnesota
and Oregon-had either "thorough and efficient" or uniformity claus-
es.140 New Jersey passed a law prohibiting schools from excluding
children from public schools on account of "religion, nationality, or
color," but a state court subsequently authorized the refusal of admis-
sion if "the schools. .. were full.' 4 1 Following the terms of the
Northwest Ordinance, Ohio's enabling act made land grants available
to every township for the use of schools in 1802.142 Similar provisions
later appeared in the enabling acts of Indiana (1816), Illinois (1818),
and Michigan (1837). 143
The Ohio Constitution not only guaranteed access to state sup-
ported schools; the state Bill of Rights included provisions for poor
children who had been victimized by discrimination in some towns. 144
These protections did not cover black or Native American children,
who were either educated in separate schools or not educated at all. 145
In 1837, the same year that Horace Mann became secretary to Massa-
134. Id.
135. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 115, at 164.
136. JAMES, supra note 128, at 128-35.
137. Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 387 (1854).
138. Eastman, supra note 83, at 13.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 19.
141. Pierce v. Union District School Trustees, 46 N.J.L. 76, 78 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1884).
142. Eastman, supra note 83, at 14.
143. Id. at 14-15.
144. OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 25 (1802).
145. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780-1860 88-89 (1983).
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chusetts' state board of education, Ohio appointed Samuel Lewis as its
first Superintendent of Public Schools. 14 6 Lewis subscribed to the val-
ues and objectives that had been incorporated in the common school
model of Horace Mann. 147 The Ohio legislature subsequently commis-
sioned a study of European systems of education, which resulted in an
endorsement of the Prussian system that had impressed Mann.
148
Reluctant to commit the necessary funding, the Ohio legisla-
ture did not enact a constitutional provision callinp for a "thorough and
efficient system of common schools" until 1851. 49 When the issue of
public schooling was brought before the Constitutional Convention of
1850-1851, a debate ensued over the wording of a proposal that would
have made schooling "free to all white children in the state." 150 Advo-
cates of the provision argued that making education available to "the
colored race" would encourage unwanted immigration. 151 The propos-
al was eventually defeated after serious consideration. 152
The delegates to the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1850-
1851 made a conscious decision to have Protestantism thrive in public
schools while at the same time prohibiting aid to other religious
schools. The same constitutional provision that organized the pat-
chwork of local schools into a uniform system of state education also
provided that "no religious sect shall, in any manner control the dis-
pensation of the school funds of the state."' 153 As one delegate to the
convention explained, the final arrangement was made possible
through the elimination of a single impediment: "the rivalry of schools
created by different sects."'154 More than twenty years would pass be-
fore the local school board of Cincinnati, responding to protests,
passed resolutions prohibiting Bible reading and religious exercises in
the public schools. 5 Similar measures were adopted in Chicago, New
York, Rochester (NY), and Buffalo (NY) at around the same time.156
146. Molly O'Brien & Amanda Woodrum, Symposium: The Ohio Constitution-Then and
Now: An Examination of the Law and History of the Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of its
Bicentennial: The Constitutional Common School, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 581, 594, 599 (2004).
147. Id. at 599.
148. Id. at 598-600.
149. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1851).
150. See O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 146, at 615.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 617.
154. Id.
155. Stephen K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST..
38, 46 (1992).
156. Id. at47.
2007] THE INADEQUACY OF ADEQUACY GUARANTEES 77
When Michigan was admitted to the Union in 1837, its enabl-
ing legislation gave title to land for schools directly to the state rather
than the towns within it: this method resulted in a more centralized ap-
proach to education. 157 The Michigan Constitution that called for the
creation of public schools granted discretion to the legislature for de-
termining how to meet this obligation.' 58 This assumption of legisla-
tive supremacy was supported by case law. 159 In 1841, the state legis-
lature enacted a law creating a separate school district for Detroit
"composed of the colored children."'  A year later, it passed a statute
that created one school district for the entire city. 161 However, the De-
troit school board continued to impose a policy requiring children to
be segregated by race. 
162
Many states, including states that had not been a part of the
Confederacy, continued to employ constitutional language to impose
racial segregation in public schools after the Civil War. For exam-
ple, the Missouri Constitution of 1865 had one clause requiring the
state legislature to "establish and maintain free schools for the gratuit-
ous instruction of all persons of the state between the ages of five and
twenty-one" 164 and another that allowed "separate schools .. for
children of African descent."' 165 In 1875, the latter clause was revised
to read: "Separate free public schools shall be established for the edu-
cation of children of African descent."'166 The West Virginia Constitu-
tion of 1872 that required a "thorough and efficient system of free
schools"' 67 also stipulated that "[w]hite and colored persons shall not
be taught in the same school.' 68 As a rule, former Confederate states
incorporated segregation clauses in the same constitutions that carried
various educational guarantees, including those that called for "equal
education" or the education of "all children."'
169
157. Eastman, supra note 83, at 15.
158. Id.
159. People ex rel. Workman v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400, 418 (1869)
(Campbell, J., dissenting).
160. Eastman, supra note 83, at 15-16.
161. Id. at 16.
162. Id. at 15-16.
163. Id. at 20-29.
164. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1865).
165. Id. at art. IX, § 2.
166. Eastman, supra note 83, at 24.
167. W.VA. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1861).
168. W.VA. CONST. art. XII, § 8 (1872).
169. Eastman, supra note 83, at 26-29.
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The history of the common school and the state laws that
created it cannot be separated from the ugly battles that took place be-
tween religious dissenters and the Protestant majority that controlled
the legislatures and the courts.170 Michigan had adopted a constitution-
al provision against aid to religious schools in 1835.'7, In 1845, after a
long dispute with Protestant leaders, the Detroit school board adopted
a measure that allowed Catholic children to use their own Bible in
public school classrooms. 172 In 1850, the Michigan Constitution was
amended to confirm prohibitions against aid to religious schools.' 73 A
Detroit newspaper portrayed the aid controversy as a conflict "between
the Jesuit Priesthood and American Citizens."'174 In 1834, the Ursuline
Convent in Boston was burned to the ground by nativists seething
from anti-Catholic sermons. 175 In 1842, the residence of Archbishop
John Hughes of New York was destroyed after he demanded that ei-
ther the Protestant Bible be removed from the public schools or that
Catholic schools be given their own funding.176 In 1844, violent rioting
occurred in Philadelphia after Bishop Kendrick made a similar de-
mand.
177
Some prohibitions against aid to religious schools were altered
through state law rather than constitutional revision. In 1844, in the
midst of political wars over aid to religious schools, the New York
State legislature passed a law prohibiting such monetary support.
178
This prohibition was carved into the state constitution in 1894 when
the present clause calling for a "system of free common schools" was
added. 79 The battle over religion exacerbated animosities that had
long been simmering between the Republican dominated legislature
and downstate Irish Catholics who were feeding enrollments in the
Democratic party.'
80
170. See JORGENSON, supra note 115; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 115.
171. JORGENSEN, supra note 115, at 101.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 102.
175. Id. at29.
176. RAVITCH, supra note 127, at 75.
177. Vincent P. Lannie & Bernard C. Diethorn, For the Honor and Glory of God: The
Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1844, 8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 44, 46 (1968).
178. Act of Jan. 2, 1844, ch. 320, § 12, 1844 N.Y. Laws 494.
179. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1894), amended by N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (2002).
180. SAMUEL T. MCSEVENEY, THE POLITICS OF DEPRESSION; POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
NORTHEAST, 1893-1896 63-86 (1972).
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VI. THE BLAINE AMENDMENT
The "School Question" moved to a national stage in 1875 when
President Ulysses S. Grant called on Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment that would "[e]ncourage free schools, and resolve that not
one dollar, appropriated for their support, shall be appropriated to the
support of any sectarian school." 181 It was a bold political gesture be-
cause lawmakers generally assumed at the time that both religion and
education were state issues. 82 The purpose of the First Amendment
was to protect the states from encroachment by the federal govern-
ment. 183 Grant put forward his proposal to distract attention from a wi-
dening corruption scandal in his own administration and to cultivate
the support of Protestant and nativist leaders. 184 His proposal was tak-
en up by Representative James Blaine of Maine, who had designs on
the presidency and would later launch a Republican campaign against
the evils of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion."' 85 Reflecting the current
political landscape, Blaine's amendment received majority support in
both houses of Congress, but failed to get the super-majority needed in
the Senate.186 In its stead, many states passed their own Blaine
Amendments through legislation, constitutional amendment, or
both. 187 By 1876, fifteen states had enacted such laws; by 1890, twen-
ty-nine had amended their constitutions.'88
Despite its failure to pass the Blaine Amendment, Congress
remained active on the issue of education and religion. After Blaine's
departure from Congress, his ally Senator Henry Blair of New Hamp-
shire unsuccessfully took up his cause by introducing five similar bills
between 1881 and 1888.189 Like Blaine, he aimed to create a system of
181. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 155, at 47.
182. In 1845, the United States Supreme Court ruled, "[t]he Constitution makes no provi-
sion for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to
the state constitutions and laws .... Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. 589, 609 (1845).
183. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33-39
(1998).
184. See VITERITTI, supra note 19, at 152-54; Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Re-
ligious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 113, 144-47 (1996); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the
First Amendment and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 670-72
(1998).
185. KIRK PORTER & DONALD JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1964 51-52
(1962).
186. Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV.
939, 944 (1951).
187. Green, supra note 155, at 43.
188. Id.
189. JORGENSON, supra note 115, at 141.
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common schools grounded in a "non-sectarian" ethos while prohibit-
ing aid to religious schools. 190 When Blair's attempts failed, he blamed
the Catholic clergy, whom he denounced as "an enemy of this coun-
try" intent on "destroying the public school system."' 91 By this time,
Blaine had sought his party's nomination for the presidency three
times and had actually received it in 1884.192 His cause lived on.
At the end of the nineteenth century, as the territories in the
Northwest and Southwest regions of the country sought statehood,
Blair and his allies passed enabling legislation that required the new
states to enact constitutional provisions that both established common
schools and prohibited aid to sectarian schools; this legislation resulted
in the education provisions still in effect today.' 93 The enabling act of
1889 that allowed North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Wash-
ington to seek statehood included such mandates. 194 Speaking in sup-
port of the legislation before Congress, Senator Blair explained that it
embodied the "very essence" of the defeated Blaine Amendment.
195
The mandates were well received in the new states, where the constitu-
tional delegations were sympathetic to Blaine's agenda.' 96 One dele-
gate to the Washington Constitutional Convention openly drew a con-
nection between the motives behind the proposals under consideration
and the anti-Catholic bigotry that prompted the original Blaine
Amendment. 1
97
President Grant proclaimed Colorado a member of the Union
in 1876 after the former territory ratified its constitution.1 98 The Colo-
rado Constitutional Convention of 1875-1876 was controlled by Re-
publicans who were in philosophical harmony with Grant (as well as
Blaine and Blair), and their disposition was reflected in the state con-
stitution.199 Like the territories of the Northwest, New Mexico was
190. Id. at 142.
191. Id. at 143.
192. GAIL HAMILTON, BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES G. BLAINE 572 (The Henry Bill Publ'g Co.
1895).
193. Robert F. Utter & Edward Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of
the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
451, 458-62 (1988).
194. Id. at 458. See also Frank Conklin & James M. Vache, The Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause of the Washington Constitution-A Proposal to the Supreme
Court, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 411,436 (1985).
195. 20 CONG. REc. 2101 (1889).
196. Id.
197. Utter & Larsen, supra note 193, at 474.
198. See PERCY STANLEY FRITZ, COLORADO: THE CENTENNIAL STATE 245-50 (1941).
199. Id. at 246; Harry M. Barrett, Education in Colorado, in COLORADO: SHORT STUDIES
OF ITS PAST AND PRESENT 127-28 (1927).
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granted statehood with the explicit condition that it incorporate a
Blaine Amendment in its constitution. 00 As in the East, the creation of
common schools in the West was very much a project organized by the
Protestant clergy, which worked simultaneously to insert its values in-
to the public school curriculum while opposing aid to schools run by
other religious groups.
20 1
It would be a mistake to conclude that the politics surrounding
the Blaine Amendment were solely motivated by religion. Religion
was in fact a proxy for other attributes. On one level, there was the
element of partisan politics that evolved as Whigs, Know-Nothings,
and eventually Republicans became wary of how Irish and German
Catholics were enhancing the fortunes of the Democratic Party, espe-
cially in urban centers.20 On another level there was the element of
class, for the crass ways of those who had come to America to escape
poverty offended the sensibilities established elites, who feared the
impact that the newcomers would have on existing social norms. In a
big way, the conflicts stemmed from a general animosity towards fo-
reigners and the multifarious cultures they brought with them. 20 3
By 1919, thirty-seven states had passed laws that made it illeg-
al to teach in a language other than English, which was a common
practice in many immigrant communities.2°4 Four years later in Meyer
v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska
law that did the same.20 5 While the Court recognized the state's legiti-
mate interest in fostering a common civic identity among citizens, it
found that the law interfered "with the calling of modem language
teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and
with the power of parents to control the education of their own."206
Just two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,0 7 the Su-
preme Court struck down an Oregon law that had required all children
200. See TOM LARSON, PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION IN NEW MEXICO 27-31 (1965).
201. David Tyack, The Kingdom of God and the Common School: Protestant Ministers
and the Educational Awakening in the West, 36 HARV. EDUC. REV. 447, 447-69 (1966).
202. See generally ERIE, supra note 124, at 25-66 (providing a background on the con-
flicts that accompanied the political incorporation of new ethnic groups in American cities);
ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 125-36 (1968); ROBERT DAHL,
WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 32-62 (1961); JEROME
MUSHKAT, TAMMANY: THE EVOLUTION OF A POLITICAL MACHINE, 1789-1865 158-207 (197 1).
203. See BILLINGTON, supra note 133; JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (4th prtg. 1998).
204. WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 61 (1964).
205. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
206. Id. at 401.
207. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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to attend public schools. 20 8 The law had been passed though a referen-
dum prompted by the Ku Klux Klan and the Scottish Right Masons in
an attempt to close down private and religious schools.20 Although the
Court was sympathetic to the state's interest in creating a "common
education" for its residents, it ruled that the state did not have the con-
stitutional authority "to standardize its children by forcing them to ac-
cept instruction from public teachers only." 210 It further opined, "The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-




VII. FROM LEGAL DOCTRINE TO PUBLIC POLICY
Taken together, the Meyer and Pierce decisions are monumen-
tal in defining the rights of parents to determine the education of their
own children as well as limiting state power to dictate that education.
But time would prove the landmark rulings to be limited victories at
best. Because of Blaine Amendments and other provisions incorpo-
rated in state law, the funding arrangements constitutionalized in most
states under the banner of common schooling discriminated against
those parents who would choose to send their children to private or re-
ligious schools by making funding available only to those who sent
their children to public schools. 212 Although the right of parents to
educate their children how and where they wished was recognized by
the Supreme Court, real choice only existed for those who could afford
to pay tuition on their own. 213 Given the educational disparities that
exist in public and private schools, especially in urban districts that
have been the focus of equity and adequacy suits, this restrictive policy
has had a major impact on the level of educational opportunity pro-
vided by the state for poor children. The most comprehensive studies
have found that poor African-American students who attend inner city
208. See JORGENSEN, supra note 115, at 205-215.
209. Id. See also David Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Battleground of the Pierce
Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968).
210. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
211. Id.
212. See generally Kyle Duncan, Secularism 's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Reli-
gious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (2003) (providing an analysis of state constitu-
tional provisions that prohibit public aid to religious schools); Mark Edward DeForrest, An
Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment
Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551 (2003); Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State
Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117 (2000).
213. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHi L.
REV. 937,942, 1024-25 (1996).
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private (especially Catholic) high schools register significantly better
proficiency, graduation, and college attendance rates than their public
school peers, even when the demographic characteristics of the stu-
dents are taken into account. 214 More recent surveys of private voucher
programs indicate that parents and students at private, mostly religious
schools, report higher levels of satisfaction than their counterparts in
public schools.
2 15
A study released by the United States Department of Education
in 2006 has cast some doubt on these prior comparisons. Based on rep-
resentative samples of reading and math scores recorded for fourth and
eighth graders, it found the academic performance of public and pri-
vate school students to be more similar when student demographics are
taken into account. 216 Specifically, it found the differences in fourth
grade reading and eighth grade math to be insignificant, while fourth
graders in public schools did better in math, and eighth graders in pri-
vate school did better in reading. 217 Viewing the data from the perspec-
tive of the total public-private experience being examined, specifically
eighth grade scores, suggests that private school students come out
better readers, while the math skills of the two populations are about
the same. Among the acknowledged methodological limitations of the
study was the relatively small sample of private schools surveyed,
which makes it impossible to account for wide variations among these
institutions.2 18
Most importantly, the study does not account for variations in
resources between public schools and private schools, which is a typi-
214. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, THOMAS HOFFER & SALLY KILGORE, HIGH
SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (1982); JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
HIGH SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES (1987); WILLIAM G. HOWELL & PAUL E.
PETERSON, THE EDUCATION GAP: VOUCHERS AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 142-43 (2002); Jeffrey
Grogger & Derek Neal, Further Evidence on the Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling,
2000 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 152-53; 159-65.
215. HOWELL & PETERSON, supra note 214, at 170-72.
216. HENRY BRAUN, FRANK JENKINS, & WENDY GRIGG, NAT'L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC.
PROGRESS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. COMPARING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS USING
HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING (2006), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/
2006461 .pdf. But see William H. Jeynes, Religion, Intact Families, and the Achievement Gap,
3 INTERDISC. J. RES. ON RELIGION art. 3, (2007), http://www.religjoumal.com/pdf/
ijrr03003.pdf (drawing on federal longitudinal data to find a narrower achievement gap in reli-
gious schools).
217. HENRY BRAUN ET AL., NAT'L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC,
COMPARING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS USING HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING 16, 23
(2006), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2006461.pdf.
218. Id. at4.
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cal flaw in the existing body of comparative research.219 It would be
quite remarkable if students who attend private schools did similarly
well academically, because parochial students do not receive public
support and therefore attend schools that are economically disadvan-
taged.220 If, as school finance reformers allege, money can matter in
determining educational outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that a
more equitable distribution of resources between public and private
schools would allow the latter to excel in bridging the achievement
gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students. A system of
school finance that funded the child rather than the school and made
more resources available to poor and low performing students would
be a more just and effective way to address existing educational dis-
parities. But, as we have already seen, most state constitutions and the
courts that interpret them would not allow it.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 22 1 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the expenditure of public funds to pay tuition for reli-
gious schools was permissible under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. 2 The 2002 case involved an Ohio school voucher
program that provided assistance for poor children in Cleveland to at-
tend nonpublic schools.223 The ruling was based on Court's 1983 rul-
ing in Mueller v. Allen,224 which approved a tuition tax credit for child-
ren who attended private and religious schools in Minnesota. 225 The
Court's approval of the spending was conditional in both cases. It held
that funding was permissible so long as the program in question (1)
has a valid secular purpose; (2) is neutral with respect religion so that
it neither favors one religion over another nor favors religion over non-
religion; (3) and provides aid to religious institutions only as a result of
independent decisions made by parents who attend the religious
219. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Schoolyard Revolutions: How Research on Urban School
Reform Undermines Reform, 118 POL. Sci. Q. 233, 253-254 (2003).
220. For example, a federal report published in October 2005 based on data from 2002
indicates that per capita spending in public schools is $8,044. JASON HILL & FRANK JOHNSON,
NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2002-2003 3 (2005), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/
2005353.pdf. Tuition at Catholic schools, the largest segment of the nonpublic sector, was re-
ported to be $2,432 at the elementary level and $5,870 at the secondary level. NCEA.org, Fre-
quently Asked Questions-Catholic Education, http://ncea.org/faq/catholiceducationfaq.asp
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
221. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
222. Id. at 664. See also Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism,
and its Effects on Liberty, Equality and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
223. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-45.
224. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
225. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-50.
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schools. 226 The Court found that the purpose of the Cleveland program
was to improve the educational opportunities of disadvantaged child-
ren beyond the chronically failing public schools in Cleveland and that
all who participated in it did so as a matter of parental choice. 227
While the Zelman decision settled the federal constitutional
question regarding aid to children who attend religious schools, Blaine
Amendments that were added to the state constitutions during the nine-
teenth century remain in effect. This raises the question as to whether
the exclusion of parochial school children from general public benefits
constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit the issue in Locke v.
Davey. 22 The 2004 case involved an appeal from a college student in
Washington, whose state scholarship was revoked because he wanted
to use it to prepare for a career in the ministry. 229 Because of the pecu-
liar facts of the case, the Court approved the state action in dispute,
and avoided ruling on the larger question concerning the constitutio-
nality of Blaine Amendments. 230 This question is likely to arise again.
Until it does, state law remains the chief obstacle to a form of educa-
tional opportunity sought by many under-served families.
231
VII. OVERCOMING HISTORY
Relying on state constitutional law to promote educational op-
portunity for disadvantaged populations is a precarious venture, espe-
cially under the guise of adequacy suits. The term "adequacy" does not
exist in most state constitutions. As previously mentioned, most of
the constitutional provisions that courts interpret in such suits are
products of an era where racial and religious bigotry permeated the
legislative process. During this time, the courts in most states tended to
defer to the legislatures for determining the scope of education and its
entitlements. And since the men who sat on the bench, most of whom
were elected, and the men who sat in the legislatures were a product of
226. Id. at 648-54.
227. Id. at 649.
228. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
229. Id. at 715-18.
230. Id. at 723 n.7, 725.
231. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blaire, Witters, and the Protection of
Religious Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299, 317-23 (2003).
232. See Mills & McLendon, supra note 69, at 387-401 (listing all of education provi-
sions in state constitutions).
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the same sociopolitical environment, they tended to reflect the same
values, priorities, and biases that shaped the legal landscape.
There appears to be more tension now between the courts and
the state legislatures in the current third wave of school finance litiga-
tion, but it is somewhat illusory. Despite the quibbling back and forth
over the price of justice, there is a strong consensus on the most signif-
icant questions between the two branches, which continue to draw per-
sonnel from the same political organizations. While plaintiffs have
prevailed in the great majority of adequacy cases decided thus far,233
no court has moved to equalize funding among districts, let alone es-
tablish allocation formulae based solely on student needs.234 And while
additional funding is allocated to poorer districts, there has not been a
discernable improvement in the educational outcomes of the districts
that have been awarded financial supplements. 235 School districts and
their representatives in the legislative branch historically have been
protective of their political and fiscal autonomy, and the courts have
been careful not to tread too far in overstepping these established
boundaries.236 With homeowners rebelling against rising property tax-
es, 237 states are less likely to impose new burdens to promote educa-
tional equity for the poor, especially if the additional revenue is used
to increase spending in inner city public schools that have shown little
promise of improvement.
In the past several years the courts have accepted a certain push
back from the executive and legislative branches. In 2005, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ended twenty-seven years of
litigation by rejecting a lower court ruling holding that the state consti-
tution required all local school districts to achieve proficiency in seven
specific areas of performance.238 In 2006, the New York Court of Ap-
peals arrived at a settlement that was much less ambitious than the
233. Between 1989 and 2007, plaintiffs won 20 of the 30 cases decided, while II others
remained pending. Molly A. Hunter, School Funding Adequacy Decisions Since 1989 (2007),
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/adequacydecisions.pdf.
234. Heise, Equal Education Opportunity, supra note 15, at 547.
235. Minori & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 65. See also William N. Evans, The Impact of
Court Mandated School Finance Reform, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE:
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 78-89 (Helen Ladd, et al. eds., 1999).
236. James Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 11I YALE
L. J. 2043, 2056 (2002).
237. Editorial, Homeowners Rebellion, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, at A20.
238. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d. 1134, 1153, 1155 (Mass. 2005). In pre-
vious decisions, the Supreme Courts in Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket v. Sundlum, 662
A.2d 40, 62 (R.I. 1995)) and Illinois (Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d. 1178,
1196 (III. 1995)), deferring to the authority of the legislatures on such matters, declined to
substitute their judgment for that of the legislature in school finance disputes.
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239
amount targeted by the trial judge in the case. After the New Jersey
Supreme Court allowed the governor to freeze spending levels for dis-
tricts in the Abbott case in 2006,240 the state legislature, with the en-
dorsement of the State Attorney General, finally agreed on a funding
plan that eliminated the special needs designation established by the
courts for so called "Abbott districts" so that a new formula could be
applied that targeted more aid to needy suburban and rural districts.24'
Since 2005, courts in Oklahoma, Indiana, Nebraska, Colorado, Ore-
gon, and Kentucky ruled that education funding is a political issue that
falls under the discretion of the legislature rather than the judiciary; as
in Massachusetts, the Texas high court reversed a trial court ruling that
had favored the plaintiffs in an adequacy suit.
242
The same state constitutional language that has been used as a
basis for adequacy suits has also been creatively applied to eliminate a
school choice program in Florida that was designed to enhance the
educational opportunities of disadvantaged students. In the 2005 case
of Bush v. Holmes,243 the Florida Supreme Court applied the "unifor-
mity" clause of its state constitution to strike down a six-year-old
voucher program that provided private school alternatives to students
who had attended chronically failing public schools. Ninety-five per-
cent of the 730 children who had participated in the program were ei-
ther African-American or Latino. 244 Article IX, Section 1 of the Flori-
da Constitution requires the state legislature to make "adequate
provision" for a "uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality sys-
tem of free public schools." 245 Rather than requiring the state to pro-
vide every child with a decent education, the five to two majority ruled
that Florida could only fulfill its constitutional obligation through the
means of public schools.2 4 6 However, it was the failure of these
schools to fulfill that mandate in the first place that precipitated the
enactment of the Florida voucher law.
247
239. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, at 57-58 (N.Y. 2006).
240. Abbott v. Burke, 901 A.2d 299, 301-02 (N.J. 2006).
241. See Catherine Gewertz, New Funding Formula in N.J Faces Hurdles. Governor
Notes Plan's Passage in Annual Speech to Lawmakers, EDUCATION WEEK, Jan. 16, 2008, at
13, 13-14.
242. See Alfred A. Lindseth, A Reversal of Fortunes: Why the Courts Have Cooled to
Adequacy Lawsuits, EDUCATION WEEK, Sept. 12, 2007, at 32.
243. 919 So. 2d. 392, 412-13 (Fla. 2006).
244. Brief for Black Alliance for Educ. Options et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lants at 3, Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d. 392 (Fla. 2006) (Nos. SC04-2323, SC04-2324, SC04-
2325).
245. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
246. Holmes, 919 So. 2d. at 407-08.
247. Id. at 400.
88 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 7:58
The same reasoning that the Florida court used to strike down
the voucher program could be used to outlaw public charter schools
that offer educational alternatives to disadvantaged students stuck in
low-performing public schools. The Ohio Supreme Court came very
close to doing just that in November 2006 when it ruled four to three
that the 1997 charter school law did not violate a state constitutional
provision mandating a system of common schools.248 However, public
charter schools that can offer alternatives to underachieving students in
forty-one jurisdictions remain vulnerable to more litigation of this
kind.
Most of the constitutional and statutory provisions that en-
forced racial segregation and neglect since the nineteenth century have
been struck from the books. But the political system still displays great
tolerance for, or perhaps patience with, the educational deprivation of
African-American and Latino children. It has not customarily accepted
the same for white middle class children. The religion question is a bit
more complex. Some have argued that restrictions against religion
found in Blaine Amendments and other state constitutional provisions
that direct public funding exclusively to public schools were not en-
tirely motivated by religious bigotry. 249 That being true, the pertinent
legal questions are whether a sufficient level of bigotry is at work to
make the provisions suspect, and more importantly, whether the cur-
rent provisions result in any form of discrimination. The current finan-
cial arrangement perpetuates a two-tiered system of opportunity in ur-
ban settings-a system of free public schools mostly populated by the
poor, and a system of private and parochial schools available to those
who can afford them.
The courts have allowed themselves wide latitude in defining
what it means to provide someone with an adequate education, but
they have not gone far enough.250 Given the latitude available for crea-
tive legal advocacy, adequacy suits can and should serve as an ambi-
tious venue for advancing educational opportunity for poor children.
The definition of a decent education needs to be reconsidered and
made anew from whole cloth, rather than the soiled tapestry upon
which state constitutions are written. A suitable point of departure
would be the landmark Brown decision of 1954, which, emboldened
by the language of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
248. State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d
1148, 1166 (Ohio 2006). See also, Erik Robelen, Ohio Supreme Court Narrowly Upholds
State Charter Law, EDUC. WK., Nov. 1, 2006, at 22.
249. See Steven Green, Blaming Blaine, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 107, 110-11 (2004).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 28-31, 43, 47 and 112.
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Amendment, articulated a call for educational and racial justice that
reached beyond the confines of state law. In Brown, a unanimous Su-
preme Court proclaimed that education is "a right that must be made
available to all on equal terms," not as one set of opportunities for the
middle class and the wealthy and another for the poor. 251 In Brown,
the Court outlined the true meaning of education in modem American
society, deeming it "the most important function of state and local
governments. 25
The Court in Brown further explained that education is "the
very foundation of good citizenship.., the principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later pro-
fessional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environ-
ment. ' 253 Volumes of social research have validated these claims.
Educational achievement is correlated with practically every social in-
dicator imaginable, from civic participation to political influence, from
employment to wealth, from physical health to mental health.254
School vouchers that allow disadvantaged students to attend
private and religious schools of their choice should be part of the re-
medy derived from school finance suits. What is proposed here is more
ambitious than the approach taken in most states. It may require more
spending on behalf of the disadvantaged, but in a less limiting way
than is normally practiced. The policies that influence the allocation of
education funding need to be reassessed. Despite the fact that school
vouchers have been controversial in middle class communities, they
can offer heavily taxed suburban residents a more cost-effective way
to redistribute resources and opportunities to disadvantaged children in
urban school districts than simply pouring money into failing schools.
Vouchers for the poor provide a more politically and economically
feasible way to address poor students' needs than adequacy settle-
ments which have proven to be of limited utility in bridging the
achievement gap.
This is not to suggest that giving school vouchers to the poor is
the sole antidote to curing the educational inequities endured by disad-
vantaged children, but a genuine system of choice for poor students
that includes private, religious, and charter schools should be part of
251. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & MEREDITH PHILLIPS, EDS., THE BLACK-WHITE
TEST SCORE GAP (1998); SUSAN MAYER & PAUL E. PETERSON, EDS., EARNING AND LEARNING:
How SCHOOLS MATTER 4-5 (1999); NORMAN H. NIE, JAN JUN & KENNETH STEHLICK-BARRY,
EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA (1996).
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any remedy.255 State courts undertake the approach that awards the
proceeds of legal settlements entirely to school systems that have been
complicit in sustaining the education gap rather than assisting the
children who have been wronged.
One does not need to focus entirely on private school alterna-
tives to understand how limited the current policies of state decision
makers are. Charter schools are public schools that operate outside the
jurisdiction of local school districts.256 They have been authorized by
the legislatures of forty states and the District of Columbia as a way to
expand educational opportunity for all children.257 A recent study
found that per pupil spending in charter schools is on average twenty-
two percent lower than that of district schools in the same communi-
ties. 258 In some jurisdictions per capita spending on charter schools is
as much as forty percent lower. 259 Yet the gross financial inequities in-
corporated in these laws have escaped the scrutiny of activists who
have gone to court to plea for fiscal fairness. These inequities harm
children who attend charter schools the same way that fiscal inequities
harm children who attend district public schools. However, there has
been no expression of outrage by those who have launched finance
suits in more than forty states.
Adequacy suits have allowed judges and legislatures to think
creatively about correcting past injustices, but they have also been
bound by the codified injustices of the past. Because most children
will continue to attend public schools run by local districts, the bulk of
attention and resources must be devoted to making these schools better
places for teaching and learning. The necessary emphasis on public
schools, however, does not have to result in the exclusion of private
and religious schools for parents who desire them as options for their
children. Any proper remedy should include adequate funding for dis-
advantaged children who choose to attend private, parochial, and char-
ter schools based on criteria set by the United States Supreme Court in
255. See VITERIrIrn, supra note 19, at 213-24. See also Joseph P. Viteritti, Defining Equi-
ty: Politics, Markets and Public Policy, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 13, 25-30
(Alan Wolfe ed., 2003).
256. See VITERITTI , supra note 19, at 64-77.
257. As of 2007, there were 3,940 such schools educating and estimated 1,156,874 child-
ren. CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S CHARTER SCHOOLS 2
(Alison Consoletti & Jeanne Allen eds., 2007), http://www.edreform.com/_upload/cercharter
_survey.pdf.
258. SHEREE SPEAKMAN & BRYAN HASSELL, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INSTITUTE, CHARTER
SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY'S NEXT FRONTIER 8 (2005), http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/
Charter/o20School%2OFunding%202005%20FINAL.pdf.
259. Id. at 2.
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260the 2002 Zelman case. While the provisions of the federal No Child
Left Behind law require school districts to provide alternatives for
children who attend public schools, thirty-nine percent of public
school districts have failed to meet that obligation.
26 P
A test case launched in 2006 by a group of parents illustrates
this dilemma. 262 Frustrated with the lack of educational progress after
thirty-three years of litigation and enormous increases in spending on
failing institutions, this class action suit on behalf of 60,000 students in
ninety-six schools sought to structure a remedy that would provide
poor parents with a pro rata share of public funds that could be di-
rected by the parent to a public, charter, private, or parochial school of
choice.263 In each of these schools, a majority of the students failed the
state proficiency tests in both language arts and math in 2005, and264
75% failed one. The lead plaintiff in the case was Van-Ness Craw-
ford, a widower with three sons in Newark's public schools. 265 While
per capita spending in the district is $16,351,66 Mr. Crawford's sons
were slated to attend Malcolm X Shabazz High School, where in 2005,
where fewer than one in five students reach the threshold for basic
math proficiency. 267 The suit was supported by the Black Ministers
Council of New Jersey and the Latino Leadership Alliance of New
268Jersey. As might be expected, the court decided the case against the
parents. Yet the case remains indicative of the kind of remedy that
must be considered if educational, racial, and economic justice is to be
attained. It is simply inexcusable to force poor parents to keep their
children in over-crowded failing public schools when other effective
options can be realized with proper funding and the willingness to im-
plement new solutions to an old problem.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The debate over school finance reform remains stymied. Advo-
cates on the left, inclined to channel more resources into ailing public
schools, instinctually resist remedies that would provide poor children
with better educational options outside of traditional schools systems.
Advocates on the right, who embrace school choice and vouchers as a
mechanism to empower parents, are skeptical of plans that would in-
crease the costs of education by investing more dollars in public
schools. The result is a tiered system of schooling that offers different
opportunities to students based on economic affluence and perpetuates
deeply rooted injustices. Jim Crow and Jim Blaine are dead, yet their
spirits hang over the school systems they helped to create. They con-
tinue to set the bounds of the discussion. They continue to obstruct the
kind of change needed to get us beyond our troubled past and help
those who have been deprived of an adequate education.
